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A major role of informal constraints is to modify, supplement, or extend formal rules. 
Therefore, a change informal rules or their enforcement will result in a disequilibrium 
situation, because what makes up a stable choice theoretic context is the total package of 
formal and informal constraints and enforcement aspects .... A new infonnal equilibrium 
will evolve gradually after a change in the formal rules. 
-Douglass C. North, 1990, 87-88. 
A critical factor in bringing about "progressive" institutional change is a sensed 
awareness within the community that there is a need to modify habitual patterns of 
thought and behavior in order to achieve a higher level of instmmental efficiency. 
-Paul D. Bush, 1987, 1102. 
Abstract 
Following the approach of institutional economics to study the interaction between 
the changing formal rules and the evolving informal constraints, alongside the dynamics 
leading to industrial evolution, this paper will firstly examine the particular social and 
economic settings which bring about the informal constraints for the business practice 
of Macao's casino junket operators, and the feedback from the system which in turn 
triggered the evolution of the informal constraints since the middle of the 1980s. 
Extending from our understanding of the custom and practice of this business in the 
"old Macao". this paper will further discuss the role of the recently promulgated Junket 
Operator Regulation in the transition of Macao's casino industry from a culturally defined 
to a more formally regulated business. In this context, impact from the change in the 
formal rules on the evolving informal constraints, and the dynamics giving rise to the 
changing structure and performance of the casino industry will also be explored. 
Key words: Junket Operator Regulation, formal rules, informal constraints, industrial 
evolution, casino business, Macao 
Introduction 
The changing structure and performance of an industry is largely affected by the 
alteration of formal rules and evolution of informal constraints. As tore-institutionalize 
the structure of the casino industry from monopoly to oligopoly, the Macao Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) Government of China introduced a new piece of regulation 
on March 20, 2002 -Administrative Regulation no 0 6/2002 -outlining the qualification 
and rules of conducting agency's business for games of chance in casino (this piece of 
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regulation is to be termed as Junket Operator Regulation in this paper). 1 This signified the 
first set of formal rules to regulate the business practices of the casino junket operators in 
Macao. 
In essence, the Junket Operator Regulation was an attempt made by the Macao 
SAR Government to normalize the practice of the casino junket operators, who had 
been conducting their business in a lawless area for almost two 
decades (Leong 2002, Eadington and Siu 2007). Before the 
promulgation of this Regulation, informal constraints were the 
principal rules followed by the junket operators to conduct their 
business. Given that the business run by the junket operators 
contributed the largest part of the gross casino revenue (GCR 
was defined as the net win derived from the provision of casino 
games) as reported in Macao, the change of the formal rules for 
governing how the junket operators conducted business, hence 
the subsequent evolution of the informal constraints, would be of 
great consequence to the future structure and performance of this 
industry. 
Formal rules include political 
(and judicial) rules, economic 
rules, and contracts whereas 
"informal constraints ... come from 
socially transmitted information 
and are a part of the heritage that 
we call culture. 
To the institutional economists (i.e., institutionalists) who are interested in the 
interrelationship between the institutional aspects of a society (e.g. the social structure 
and public policy system) and the evolution of its economy, the interaction between 
formal rules and informal constraints generates a dynamic force driving to the changing 
structure of an industry, hence altering its performance over time. Broadly speaking, 
"formal rules include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts" (North, 
1990, 47), whereas "informal constraints ... come from socially transmitted information 
and are a part of the heritage that we call culture" (ibid, 37). Indeed, "while formal rules 
can be changed overnight by polity, informal constraints change very slowly. Both are 
ultimately shaped by the subjective perceptions people possess to explain the world 
around them, which in turn determine explicit choices of formal rules and evolving 
informal constraints" (North, 1997, I). 
The institutionalist approach to studying the dynamics of industrial evolution 
will be adopted in this paper whereby the evolution of the junket operator business in 
Macao's casino industry would be disclosed through a systematic analysis of historical 
evidences. In addition, recent changes in the formal rules introduced by the Macao SAR 
Government to regulate the junket operators in conducting their business, the evolution of 
the informal constraints before and after the regulatory change, as well as the dynamics 
generated to alter the structure and performance of this industry, will be examined. To 
reveal the changing trends in the junket operator business since the introduction of the 
Junket Operator Regulation, data as released by the Gaming Inspection and Coordination 
Bureau (DICJ), and the Statistics and Census Service (DSEC) of the Macao SAR would 
be applied for running statistical analysis." Expectantly, findings presented in this study 
would enrich our understanding about the unique features and evolution of Macao's 
casino industry in the past, present and foreseeable future. 
Official documents in Macao are available only in Chinese and Portuguese. In this paper. the title of a legal document is 
translated from the official Chinese version by including all the key terms while simultaneously preserving its underlying 
meaning. In addition. the short title of a legal document is stated in the most common terms/meanings as a reflection of the 
nature of the document as applied in the world market. 
For example. the term ··prompter·· is applied in certain translations of the Adntinistrative Regulation no" 6/2002. On the 
other hand. in a sentinar held by the Ganting Inspection and Coordination Bureau on April 19 2006. this Regulation is 
simply tenned in English as ''Defining the eligibility of junket operation··. From the academic and practical point of view . 
.. agenC or "junket operator"' is reckoned as a more precise term to represent the subject in the casino business being con-
sidered by this piece of regulation. 
2 Unlike the US and some other well-regulated casino jurisdictions. quantitative infonnation about Macao's casino industry 
had largely been unavailable to the general public before the handover of Macao to China as of December 20. 1999. 
Subsequent to the handover. although more data were released by the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau of the 
Macao SAR. quarterly data were made available only starting from year 2005. 
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Evolution of the casino junket operators 
and their business in the "old Macao" 
Throughout the evolution of our modern economic society. its structure and 
performance are complexly determined by interactions among various parties who are 
simultaneously in the pursuit of their own material ends. During the process. formal rules 
define the broad scope of businesses and form the majority-approved (legal) relationship 
among the various economic participants. To materialize individual exchanges in the 
markets. however, informal constraints always play an important role in bringing together 
the buyers and sellers, and specifying their "ways of business" over time. In other words, 
informal constraints are the "extensions, elaborations. and qualifications of rules that 
'solve' innumerable exchange problems not completely covered by formal rules and 
that in consequence have tenacious survival ability." (North 1997, 4) This concept about 
the attributes of informal constraints provides a sound analytical framework which is 
especially critical to enhance our understanding about the evolving business practices of 
service industries ranging from hospitality, tourism, recreation, and not surprisingly, also 
gaming. 
In principle, Macao's gambling business was legalized by the Macao-Portuguese 
Macao s gambling business 
was legalized by the Macao-
Portuguese Government in 1847. 
Nevertheless, the regulatory 
system was weakly structured and 
rules were loosely enforced. 
Government in 1847. Nevertheless, the regulatory system was 
weakly structured and rules were loosely enforced. Archives of 
the Macao-Portuguese Government's rules in relation to granting 
contracts of gambling business (mainly various forms of Chinese 
lotteries and fan tan game) between the 1880s and the 191 Os, 3 
revealed that the content of those documents was simply for 
defining the permissible scope of gambling business, which in 
turn was for the obvious purpose of tax imposition. In addition, 
the first piece of Gaming Law was not promulgated until 1961. 
Because of the weakness of the regulatory system in controlling and monitoring the 
practice of the gambling business, informal constraints had long been the dominant 
elements governing the daily interactions of these participants. 
Among all the business activities that were largely shaped and guided by informal 
constraints, an important form of business was the service provided by the agents (i.e., 
junket operators) who led players (mainly high rollers4) from the neighboring regions to 
gamble in Macao. In addition to earning gaming commission, many of the agents were 
simultaneously pursuing their individual interests from conducting the business with the 
casino operator- especially those involved in various forms of underground business. 
At the end of the 19'h century and the first half of the 20'h century, as a result of the social 
and political instability in Mainland China. and the Chinese government's intention 
to prohibit gambling, players from the Mainland were organized by a group of agents 
- jinke- to gamble in this Portuguese enclave (Liu 2002, 406). In Chinese, jinke means 
the introduction (jin) of customers (ke ). Indeed, those jinkes were the ancestors of junket 
operators in Macao's gambling history. The nature and organization of this business had 
been proved much more complicated than the junket operators' business as commonly 
understood in North America and Australia. 
Given that the majority of those junket operators possessed extensive social 
connections (including their association with the underground economy, or even with 
various triad groups), and their businesses were not policed by any form of government 
regulation, their business practice and interrelationship with the casinos were largely 
bound by informal constraints. Throughout a long period of time, the various junket 
operators and the casino operators were pooled together by the common incentive (value) 
of reaping the monetary benefits associated with the gambling business. While the junket 
3 For example. (Contract) Noo 22. Attachment 2.June 6 1882: (Announcement) Noo 42. October 12 1885: ...... (Contract) 
Noo 48. December 2 1911. Chinese-translated version of these documents is released in Tang and Wu (Eds.). June 2002. 
4 In the history of Macao's gambling business. "high rollers'" are generally referred to those who bring in large sums of 
money to gamble. There is no specific criterion (e.g., USD20.000. USD40.000. etc.) as to define or ditlerentiate this group 
of players. 
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operators contributed to enlarging the customer base of the casinos, the casino operators, 
armed with the exclusive rights to run casino gaming, provided junket operators with 
the necessary conditions for their pursuit of their respective business objectives, through 
arranging players to gamble in Macao. 
The middle of the 1980s marked a crucial change in the structure of the junket 
operator business. In 1984, the STDM (i.e., the gaming monopoly before the opening 
of Macao's casino industry in 2002) informally outsourced5 some of its gaming rooms 
-called the "private VIP rooms" or simply "gambling rooms"- to certain third parties 
who possessed the social network to attract high rollers to gambling in Macao on a 
continuous basis, and were offered certain conditions (e.g., rent and charges). On top of 
the conventional entitlement to junket operators (i.e., commissions for sale of gaming 
chips), a private-YIP-room contractor was able to share, for 
instance, 30% to 40% of the net win derived from running 
the gambling rooms. To reap this portion of gaming revenue, 
the private-YIP-room contractor had to enter into an informal 
contract (e.g., an oral agreement) with the gaming monopoly to 
underwrite a substantial amount of non-redeemable chips (for 
instance, 10 million Macao dollars6) on a monthly basis. With 
the introduction of the private VIP rooms, the gaming monopoly 
could secure the flow of gaming revenue at the least possible 
With the introduction of the 
private VIP rooms, the gaming 
monopoly could secure the flow 
of gaming revenue at the least 
possible business cost. 
business cost. By retaining the private VIP rooms as part of their properties (they were 
never formally contracted out to any third party), they asserted their full compliance with 
the Gaming Law- Law no 0 6/82/M: Games of chance law (1982). which prohibited a 
casino concessionary from contracting its business out to any third party (as stated in 
article 18, 1 b). 
In addition, although a casino operator was disallowed by law to grant casino credit, 
the operating practice of a junket operator and his VIP players was never restrained (nor 
defined) by any regulation. Consequently, while most junket operators were running 
their business in a grey area, "gambling credit" was commonly adopted as a key measure 
to attract high-end players. The casino operator remained in a position to allege the 
full legitimacy of its practices. Nevertheless, the conventional "casino operator/junket 
operators" relationship evolved to a much more complicated "casino operator/private-
YIP-room contractors/junket operators" hierarchy (Leong, 2002; Siu, 2006; Eadington 
and Siu, 2007). As a matter of fact, the private-YIP-room contractors were also junket 
operators; it was just that they were at the height of the hierarchy of this business and 
were the ones who dealt with the casino operator directly. 
Under the private-YIP-room structure, the nominal performance of Macao's casino 
industry was notably elevated- between 1985 and 1997,7 gross casino revenue recorded a 
compound annual growth rate of over 20% (increased from an approximately USD0.225 
billion business to an USD2.346 billion business).8 Despite the impressive business 
achievement in monetary terms, the unavoidable drawbacks were the business activities 
of those private-YIP-room contractors and their business relationship with other junket 
operators at the lower hierarchy, operating in a lawless area. Tempted by the high cash 
transactions associated with this barely regulated business, the endeavors of these various 
participants to maximize their benefits from running the private-YIP-room business set 
the stage for the wide-spread and uncontrolled organized crime as evident in the second 
half of the 1990s (Brady 1998). Indeed, the indirect relationship evolved between the 
5 In accordance with the Macao-Portnguese Government's regulation. a firm gained the concession of exclusiveness (i.e. the 
gaming license) to operate the gambling business in Macao was not pennitted to lease (or contract) its business to any third 
party. 
6 The denomination of Macao dollar is MOP. and I USD=8MOP. 
7 The period from 1985 to 1997 fairly reflected the contribution of the private-YIP-room business to Macao's casino revenue. 
In 1998 and 1999. Macao's casino business was badly hit by internal social chaos and econmnic downturn in the neighbor-
ing regions (especially Hong Kong). Then, the performance of the casino industry was influenced by Macao's handover and 
its opening in 2002. 
8 The rate is calculated by data as released in Aomen Shui~hi (in Chinese) 2000. Table VIII. 169: Aomen Bocaiye Zongheng 
(in Chinese) 2002. 305. 
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I private-YIP-room business and the organized crime in Macao's casino industry in the 1990s was in parallel with Schelling's view on the nature of organized crime in a society 
The unavoidable drawbacks were (Schelling 1984, 179-194). During the process, the various 
the business activities of those 
private-VIP-room contractors 
and their business relationship 
with other junket operators at the 
lower hierarchy, operating in a 
lawless area. 
individual groups' efforts to fight for the dominant informal "rule-
making role" in the private-YIP-room business inevitably turned 
out as "the organized use of violence". 
Promulgation of the Junket Operator Regulation 
- a change in the formal rules and the evolution of 
subsequent informal constraint 
In response to the public interest to open the casino industry 
following the handover of Macao to China on December 20, 
1999, alongside the mounting concern over the deficiencies in the regulatory system, the 
Macao SAR Government revised the existing Law noo 6/82/M and promulgated Law 
no 0 16/2001 "The legal regime applicable to the operation of games of chance in casino 
(2001)- the new Gaming Law, on September 19. 2001. Under Article 52 of the new 
Gaming Law, it is stated that the government would assume the future responsibility to 
promulgate complementary regulations as necessary to control and monitor the practice 
of the casino business. These complementary regulations encompass the operations of 
gambling rooms and the activities of participants in the casino business. Subsequently, 
the Junket Operator Regulation was promulgated on March 20, 2002. This constitutes 
the first piece of regulation in an attempt to govern the qualification and activities of the 
junket operators (including the private-YIP-room contractors) through a formal licensing 
procedure. 
Under the Junket Operator Regulation, the relationship between i) the private-
YIP-room contractors (called "junket promoters" in the Regulation) and the casino 
operators, ii) the private-YIP-room contractors and their associated junket operators at 
the lower hierarchy of this business (called "junket collaborators") are formally defined. 
In addition, the procedures for application and renewal of a junket operator license, and 
the procedures for government to approve a license are also explained in the document. 
In spite of the fact that the promulgation of this Regulation marks a progressive change 
in Macao's regulatory system, this Regulation is still far from complete or sufficient 
by international standard, in terms of blocking Macao's gambling room business from 
its conventional relationship with underground economic activities. For example, 
although disclosure of personal information is required for an application, and disclosed 
information is treated as a crucial determinant of final approval, there is neither specific 
criterion for background check, nor clear indication about how disclosed information 
would be applied to evaluate whether an applicant meets the qualifications to be a 
casino junket operator. In Article 10 of the Regulation, although it is stated that "it is the 
responsibility of the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (DICJ) to carry out the 
procedure of examining the proper qualification, and this procedure is to be concluded by 
a report as compiled by the Director of the DICJ", the criteria for the DICJ in completing 
the report are yet commonly known to the general public. 
Despite the incompleteness of the first version of the Junket Operator Regulation, 
the public urge for formalizing the structure and performance of the junket operators is 
evident. Although the custom of this business was bred in a lawless area in "old Macao" 
for almost two decades, and the long-established informal interrelationship between 
the gaming monopoly, the YIP-room operators, and their associated junket operators at 
the various levels could hardly be re-instituted immediately with the promulgation of 
a single piece of regulation, the evolution of this business was indeed showing gradual 
and crucial changes. The progress was gradual, because when Macao's casino industry 
was first opened and the Regulation was promulgated, a significant number of the 
existing junket operators were still yet ready to mold themselves and their business to 
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meet up with the formal requirements. To minimize the possible shock which might lead 
to serious contraction in the turnover of the existing casinos, the Regulation allows a 
transition period before full enforcement. According to Article 36, 'The entities, who are 
carrying out the junket business at the date (i.e., March 20, 2002) when this Regulation 
is enforced, may temporarily continue to carry out their junket business until the first 
licensing process for junket operation as carried out in accordance with this Regulation 
is completed". Consequently, junket operators and their associates were only required to 
submit their applications for business licenses from May 2004; and the Junket Operator 
Regulation is to be enforced in principle from July 2005 (Macau Daily News, May 8, 
2004 and June 16, 2005). 
Between the promulgation of the Junket Operator Regulation in 2002 and its 
enforcement in July 2005, the practice of the junket operators and their business 
underwent significant changes. For instance, instead of operating on individual bases, a 
formal association was established in October 2004 as a collective representation of its 
members' interests. In addition, as the informal activities (especially those related to the 
underground economy in the "old Macao") of the junket operators started to be regulated, 
and aggressive business strategies were undertaken by the new casino operators, business 
performance of the existing private VIP rooms showed obvious deviation from the 
traditional pattern since 2003. As depicted in Figure 1, although VIP Baccarat remained 
the dominant source of income to Macao's casino industry, its share in the industry's 
GCR decreased significantly from 77.3% in 2003 to 64.9% in 2006. On the other hand. 
the share of mass-market baccarat was almost doubled from 10.8% to 21.0%. 
Before the opening of the Las Vegas Sands Casino in May 2005, reported revenue 
from VIP baccarat (or VIP play) mainly referred to the part of GCR derived from the 
baccarat tables based in the traditional private VIP rooms. According to the official 
statistics, VIP baccarat was different from the mass-market baccarat (or non-VIP play) in 
terms of the premium charge per table which was payable to the government on top of the 
gambling tax imposed on GCR. While annual premium fee charged for a baccarat table 
based in a private VIP room was MOP300,000 (which was payable proportionally on a 
monthly base), the fee for the same table positioned on the gaming floor (i.e., the mass 
market) was MOP150,000. Although the traditional private-YIP-room operating system 
is kind of being phased out, the differentiation between VIP baccarat and mass-market 
baccarat remains common to the other new casinos. For example, even the Sands Casino 
runs in strict compliance with the Nevada Government's requirements in conducting its 
VIP business, its tables based in the VIP area (or VIP rooms) are required to pay the same 
MOP300,000 annual premium fee, hence included in the gross amount of VIP baccarat 
revenue as released by the Macao Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau.9 
Figure 1: Changing contribution of VIP Baccarat and mass-market Baccarat to the GCR 
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9 Currently. no breakdown is available from the DICJ or individual casino operators as to indicate the VIP baccarat revenue 
derived !rom the traditional private VIP rooms and the VIP rooms of the US operators respectively" 
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An interesting phenomenon revealed in Figure I is that, as the single form of game 
producing over 85% of Macao's GCR, the shares of VIP baccarat and mass-market 
baccarat in Macao's casino industry arc largely negatively correlated (the correlation 
coefficient of their shares in the GCR between 1998 and 2006 is -0.8853 ). A possible 
explanation of this phenomenon is the rotation of a certain group of players between the 
VIP play and the non-VIP play. Since the tradition of the VIP rooms involved sharing 
of gaming revenue between casino operators and YIP-room contractors, as well as 
informal commission sharing between the YIP-room contractors and their associated 
junket operators, it had been a common practice of the junket operators (especially those 
in the lower hierarchy of this business) to "informally" approach high- and middle-end 
players in the mass market and '"lead" them to gamble in the VIP rooms. For example, 
personal credits or "personal protection" were offered to players who were persuaded to 
switch their play to the private VIP rooms. Following the promulgation and enforcement 
of the Junket Operator Regulation. and the promulgation of Law noo 5/2004: Juridical 
system for credit granting for gaming or gambling in casino (2004)- the Casino Credit 
Law in May 2004, the "informal" activities of the existing junket operators started to be 
regulated. In addition. as more choices were available to the players since the opening of 
the casino industry (e.g., the Las Vegas Sands Casino was opened in May 2004 and Wynn 
Resorts in September 2006 ), it was noted that a portion of the existing YIP-table players 
chose to return to the mass market, as middle-end or high-end players. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, it was due to the unique classification of VIP play and 
mass-market play in Macao (i.e. determined by the premium fee charge for a gambling 
table instead of players' betting amounts), gambling expenditure of the low-end 
and middle-end "VIP players" outside of the traditional private VIP rooms were not 
accounted as VIP baccarat revenue, irrespective of their spending level. Moreover, the 
success of the Sands Casino in cultivating the mass market of various levels largely 
explained the migration of players from the existing private VIP rooms to the mass 
market in 2004 and 2005. In 2006, the slight rebound of the VIP baccarat share could be 
attributable to the aggressiveness of the Sands Casino in expanding its VIP play and the 
opening of the Wynn Resorts in September 2006. Although no breakdown is available, it 
is fair to expect that while total turnover of the traditional private VIP rooms is shrinking, 
the formal VIP play as introduced by the two American casino operators is on the track to 
expansiOn. 
Figure 2: Primary forces responsible for the changing performance of the VIP 
baccarat and mass-market baccarat in 2004 and 2005 
VIP Baccarat 
(Baccarat tables located inside particular gaming 
rooms. and pay an annual premium fee of 
MOP300,000 per table to the government) 
Mass-market Baccarat 
(Baccarat tables located in the mass gaming 
floor, and pay an annual premium tee of 
MOP I 50,000 per table to the government) 
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Moreover, as shown in Table 1, while the correlation coefficient between the number 
of visitor arrivals and the VIP baccarat revenue was weakened between 2002 and 2005, 
the coefficient with the mass-market baccarat revenue was getting increasingly stronger 
(increased from 0.2109 between 1998 and 2001 to 0.9552 between 2002 and 2005). 
Although the coefficient with the VIP baccarat bounced back to its 1998-2001 level with 
the inclusion of 2006 data into the calculation (this was in line with the phenomenon as 
revealed in Figure 1 ). it was still lower than the coefficient with the mass-market baccarat 
(i.e., 0.9513 v. 0.9748). Indeed, even the changing business performance of the VIP 
baccarat and mass-market baccarat in relation to the changing number of visitor arrivals 
can be attributed to more than the factor of the Junket Operator Regulation. the latter 
does form an essential element to exercise control over the informal ways practiced by 
the businesses in the "old Macao." especially the part of casino-related businesses with 
high correlation with the underground economy and organized crimes. By weakening the 
traditional informal influence of the junket operators over the casino business, the room 
which is necessary for development of the mass market is reinstated. 
Table 1: Changes in the correlation coefficients between the number of visitor 
arrivals, VIP baccarat revenue and mass-market baccarat revenue 
Corr( visitor. VIP baccarat revenue) Corr(visitor. mass-market baccarat revenue) 
1998-2006 0.9771 0.9431 
1998-2001 0.9515 0.2109 
2002-2005 0.8987 0.9552 
2002-2006 0.9513 0.9748 
2005 1q-2005 4q -0.7621 0.9558 
2005 lq-2006 lq 0.2557 0.7305 
2005 1q-2006 2q 0.4816 0.7405 
2005 1q-2006 3q 0.7065 0.7377 
2005 1q-2006 4q 0.8845 0.8182 
- ~-
* The correlation coefficients presented in the first 4 rows are measured by employing 
annual data, while the last 5 rows are on quarterly data (quarterly data in relation to 
breakdown of casino revenue are available only from the first quarter of 2005). 
Data of VIP baccarat revenue and mass-market baccarat revenue are retrieved from 
the website of the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau. http://www.dicj.gov. 
mo/EN/index.htm 
Data of visitor arrivals are retrieved from the website of the Statistics and Census 
Service. http//:www.dsec.gov.mo/index.asp?src=/English/htm/e_tourism.html 
Based on the second part of Table 1, it is reasonable to project both the VIP and non-
YIP markets to undergo significant changes. In the first four quarters of 2005, although 
the number of visitor arrivals increased substantially under the Individual Visit Scheme 
(IVS) (an initiative undertaken by the Chinese Government which substantially simplified 
the visa application process for Chinese residents in the selected cities to visit Hong 
Kong and Macao), business performance of the VIP baccarat was surprisingly correlated 
negatively with the number of visitor arrivals (the correlation coefficient was -0.7621 ). 
On the contrary, the mass-market performance was highly correlated with the number of 
visitor arrivals (the correlation coefficient is 0.9558). Entering into year 2006, it was then 
evident that the VIP business had started a close relationship with the increasing number 
of visitor arrivals. Nevertheless, the changing performance was largely contributed by 
the growth of the formal VIP business as conducted by the new casino operators (e.g. the 
Sands Casino and Wynn Resorts), instead of there-expansion of the traditional private 
VIP rooms. Indeed, the business scale of the latter was downsizing- "Mr. Ho (Macao's 
gaming tycoon who controlled the former gaming monopoly and obtained one of the 3 
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new gaming licenses through his newly formed gaming company in 2002 - SJM) once 
said that 50 of the SJM's total VIP halls of 150. might be forced to close down'' (Yi 2006, 
A3). 
Two parallel VIP markets under the 
Junket Operator Regulation and foreseeable evolution 
A remarkable result of the opening of Macao's casino industry is the entry of such 
world-class casino operators as Las Vegas Sands, Wynn Resorts and MGM from North 
America, as well as PBL from Australia.w Nevertheless, the fundamental differences in 
the legal framework and implementation of the regulatory system between North America 
and Macao lead to emergence of two parallel VIP markets in Macao's casino industry. 
On the one side of the market, the local casino operator (i.e., the SJM) and the non-
American operators (e.g., Galaxy) are running their VIP business largely on the 
traditional model, especially in terms of the revenue sharing model under the practice of 
the private VIP rooms (Chang 2007), while simultaneously making gradual modifications 
as to correspond with the Junket Operator Regulation. As of the end of January 2007, 
for example, 92 corporate entities (i.e., a company or a partnership) and 68 individual 
entities were registered and approved by the DICJ as legal junket operators (the same 
were talking about 41 and 35 respectively in January 2006)Y Yet, as compared to the 
thousands of junket operators who are practicing at the lower levels of this business 
(especially those so-called chip rollers at the lower hierarchy of this business, see Leong 
2002. Figure I; Siu 2006, Figure I; Eadington and Siu 2007, Figure 3), efficacy of this 
Regulation is evidently in question, and the evolution of the informal "way of business" 
in the "old Macao" is obviously changing only at a gradual pace. 
In addition, the long-established and customary-defined private-YIP-room businesses 
add further to the complication, causing difficulties to policy makers to draft the first 
version of the Junket Operator Regulation. Precision and enforcement of this Regulation 
are confined. For example, to assess if a corporate entity is qualified for a junket operator 
It is reasonable to project that license, Article 8 of the Regulation states that shareholders 
th t d 't · l · t VIP who own 5% or more of the capital, the directors, and the main e ra z wna przva e- -room . . employees of the company must submit the correspondmg 
business will not be completely "Information Disclosure Form" to the DICJ for investigation. 
removed in the coming decade, However, the term "main employees" is never defined by the 
th h 't l b Regulation, nor could it be clarified in details by the DICJ or the even oug l s sea e may e Macao SAR Government. 
contracting over time. As a matter of fact, the above is a classical demonstration of 
the institutionalists' argument that "while formal rules can be 
changed overnight by policy, informal constraints change very slowly" (North, 1997, 
1). In other words, although the opening of Macao's casino industry and the subsequent 
promulgation of the Junket Operator Regulation formally mark a new era for the 
traditional private YIP-room business, the transition from the informal way of business to 
a well-regulated layout may not be completed within a short period of time. Considering 
the scale of the business in the "old Macao", it is reasonable to project that the traditional 
private-YIP-room business will not be completely removed in the coming decade. even 
though its scale may be contracting over time. 
On the other side of the market, the new entrants from North America are running 
their YIP-play business in strict adherence to the Nevada gaming law, which prohibits 
them from employing the "casino operator/private-YIP-room contractors/junket 
operators" model in their oversea business. For example. according to the NRS (Nevada 
10 After granting the 3 concessions to SJM. Wynn Resorts. and a joint venture of Galaxy from Hong Kong and Venetian 
from Las Vegas in 2002. the Macao SAR Government approved the restructuring of Galaxy to become the formal conces-
sion holder and Venetian the sub-concession holder in 2004. In addition. MGM from the US and PBL from Australia also 
obtained the formal approval of sub-concessions in 2005 and 2006 respectively. through their deals with SJM and Wynn 
Resorts. 
11 The official list is available only from the Chinese website of the Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (http:// 
www.dicj.gov.mo/CH!LicPromJogo/lista/20070!22.htm). 
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Revised Statutes) 463.720: Prohibited Practice, "A licensee shall not, in a foreign gaming 
operation, knowingly: ...... 2. Fail to conduct the operation in accordance with the 
standards of honesty and integrity required for gaming in this state (Nevada); ...... ". 
Under the NRS 463.720 and the related regulations, a Nevada-based casino licensee 
is disallowed to run its business through a gaming-room operator by offering benefit 
of sharing gross gaming revenue. In addition, procedures/requirements of background 
check are very strict by the Nevada law, which may deprive the North-American casino 
operators of the right to employ the existing junket operators from the "old Macao". 
Therefore, while the non-American casino operators are conducting their YIP-baccarat 
business on the Junket Operator Regulation in Macao, the American casino operators 
"must adhere to Nevada state regulation on top of any other local regulation" (Leonard 
2005) in conducting their business in Macao. 
Given the long-established, well-enforced regulatory system imposed by the Nevada 
naming Control Board (as well as the Casino Control Commission in New Jersey), and 
in view of the highly-invested world-class brand names, it is unlikely that the American 
operators would step back by employing Macao's traditional revenue sharing model 
in their VIP business. On the one hand, periodical detection conducted by the Nevada 
Gaming Control Board serves as an influential external force to recapitulate the standard 
of the American operators in their oversea business at Macao, and to a certain extent, 
insulate their business from being infected by the informal activities as commonly 
practiced during this transition period. On the other hand, opportunity costs (i.e., risking 
their casino licenses in the States and their world-class brand names) may also be far too 
high for the American operators to outsource their VIP business to a third party. 
These two factors may also serve as the guiding force to any American operator who 
is conducting its casino business in Macao through a joint venture or partnership with 
a o{vcal operator. For example, after MGM announced its joint venture agreement with 
Pansy Ho (who obtained a sub-concession from SJM which was owned by her father, 
the Macao gaming tycoon Dr. Stanley Ho) in June 2004 (MGM in Macau casino deal, 
June 23, 2004, and Coleman, February 3, 2005), it took almost 3 years for the MGM to 
settle all the legal requirements with various gaming control authorities in the States. The 
comprehensive review process undertaken by the Nevada and New Jersey governments 
clearly signals to the market that the traditional Macao casino operation model employed 
by the local operators could not be reconciled with the North American model. Although 
the final approval is gained by the MGM in 2007, its joint venture business with the 
local operator in Macao is in principle strictly monitored by the US gaming regulations. 
To the American operators and the gaming control authorities. running and monitoring 
the casino business in this Chinese enclave of Macao is definitely a "discovery" which 
is associated with lots of challenges. In the foreseeable future, proactive public policies 
must be devised by the American gaming control authorities to tackle the new issues that 
may come into place during the transition of Macao's casino industry. 
Given the tradition of Macao's casino business, and the expansion of the modernized 
and formally regulated casino business lately introduced by the North-American casino 
operators, it is foreseeable that the phenomenon of two distinctive markets running in 
parallel, would last for at least another decade. In view of the institutional and structural 
disparities between these two markets. their economic performances are also evidently 
divergent. In 2005, for example, the operation results reported by the local operator (the 
SJM), the non-American operator (the Galaxy Waldo) and the American operator (the Las 
Vegas Sands Casino) well illustrate the co-existence of these two markets. 
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Table 2: Business performance of the 3 casino operators in 2005 
GCR (billion USD) •JJ/Total of (l) Gross profit after tax @/Total of@ 
CD billion USD)@ 
SJM 4.3011 74.63% 0.6950 70.04% 
Sands 0.9633 16.72% 0.2965 29.88% 
Galaxy Waldo 0.4985 8.65% 0.0008 0.08% 
Total 5.7629 100.00% 0.9923 100.00% 
* Data presented in the columns "GCR" and "Gross profit after tax" arc derived from 
Macao Daily News, April 27 2006, p. A I. USD I =MOPS 
According to the business performance as presented in Table 2, it is reasonable to 
highlight that: 
i) In terms of OCR, over 80% of the market share goes to the operation of the 
traditional business (i.e. the sum of SJM and Galaxy Waldo). Although the local operator 
has introduced various programs to diversify its existing business (e.g., investment in the 
expansion of slot business and improvement of the existing mass-market business) since 
2002. the existing private VIP rooms remain as the dominant source for sustaining its 
overall business turnover. In addition, it is also well known that the first casino (Galaxy 
Waldo) of the new non-American operator also gives emphasis to the traditional private-
YIP-room business. 
ii) By assessing the business performance in terms of "OCR" and "gross profit after 
tax", it is found that the business efficiency of the "old Macao" is much lower than that 
of the "new Macao" - the profit margin of the American operator is much higher than 
that of the other two participants. In terms of GCR. the Sands Casino shared 16.72% 
of the market in 2005; it reaped almost 30% of the industry's gross profit after tax. A 
possible explanation to this ditlerence is that as the traditional revenue sharing model of 
the VIP rooms are not employed by the Sands Casino, a significant amount of operational 
expenses is saved, especially the share of GCR to the YIP-room contractors, as practiced 
by the casino business in the "old Macao." 
Since the formal rules guiding the practice of the private-YIP-room business in 
Macao "may" not be permissible by the Nevada gaming law, the North American 
operator deploys effective and aggressive strategies to develop the mass market which 
was however overlooked by the local operator before opening of the industry. For 
example, the mass market recorded 44% cumulative growth as compared with the VIP 
market of only 3% growth in the first quarter of 2006 (Tang & Ye, April 19 2006). In 
fact, the success of the new entrant in developing the mass market paves the way for the 
development of high profit-margin market, which co-exists with the low profit-margin 
market as revealed in Table 2. 
In principle, evidence suggests that the two parallel markets (i.e .. the traditional 
private-YIP-room market of the local operator and the formal YIP-play market of the 
North American operators, or the low and high profit margin markets), will continue to 
co-exist for a long period of time. While it is projected that the formal and high profit 
margin portion would be expanding, it is also believed that the traditional and low 
profit margin portion would not that easily be phased out due to its absolute size and 
long-established social foundation in Macao society, particularly the interrelationship 
between the casino operators, the private-YIP-room contractors, and the associated junket 
operators. 
Before concluding this paper. it is worthwhile to give some highlights about the 
Casino Credit Law (Law no a 5/2004 ). Although the role of this law in the evolution of 
Macao's casino industry is by itself, another essential topic warranting comprehensive 
study, its structure and enforcement are highly correlated with the Junket Operator 
Regulation. Similar to the Junket Operator Regulation, promulgation of the Casino Credit 
Law in 2004 represents the first attempt of the Macao SAR Government to monitor the 
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal+ Volume 11, Issue 2 59 
practice of this informal business as operated in the "old Macao" for decades. and to 
better align them with the formal ways of business as conducted in the global casino 
markets. Since casino credit was prohibited in accordance with the Macao-Portuguese 
Government's regulation and before the enforcement of the Casino Credit Law, informal I credits made available to casino players were granted by the 
junket operators and their associates at various hierarchies of 
the private-YIP-room business. All these historical setups laid 
down the blueprint of the Casino Credit Law. For example. while 
stated in n. 0 1 of Article 3 that the "concessionaries" (i.e., casino 
license holders) and ''sub-concessionaries" (i.e., casino sub-
license holders) are legal entities to operate as "credit grantors", 
it is added in n. o 2 of this Article that "game prompters" 
Although the American operators 
are allowed to apply casino 
credit in their Macao businesses, 
the scale is relatively small as 
compared with that of the local 
(i.e., registered junket operators) "may also operate as credit 
grantors" with the consent from the '"concessionaries" or "sub-
concessionaries" to operate the casino credit business. 
operators. 
Indeed, two parallel markets are also operated under the Casino Credit Law. By the 
law, although the American operators are allowed to apply casino credit in their Macao 
businesses, the scale is relatively small as compared with that of the local operators. 
A major reason is that in evaluation of the American operators' application for credits 
without employment of the local junket operators, they have to rely on formal credit 
history of the applicants (as what they do in the United States). Different from their 
business in the States, most of the potential credit applicants in Macao's casinos are 
Chinese who do not possess any US-required credit history. On the other hand, since most 
of the existing junket operators who work with the local and non-American operators 
have been running business in the Chinese community for years, they are backed by 
a strong social network and with knowledge about channels to access the potential 
candidates for casino credits; most of them are simply continuing their traditional way of 
business, with the only exception that their legitimacies are now ratified. 
To a large extent, promulgation of the Casino Credit Law is a positive action taken 
by the Macao SAR Government for attending the request by the American operators, 
particularly answering to the argument that casino credit serves as a common and essential 
measure to conduct their YIP-play business. Constrained by the Government's inexperience 
and time pressure, the Law is however far from completion, not to mention perfection. 
Similar to the Junket Operator Regulation, effective enforcement of this Law is largely 
restricted by its ambiguities and shortage of operational details. For example, it is stated in 
n. 0 3 of Article 3 that if a credit grantor "seriously violates" the regulations in conducting 
the business, or shows "a clear lack of the technical qualifications·· for operating the 
business, its business qualification will be suspended or terminated. Simultaneously, the 
credit grantor may also need to assume any civil or criminal liability from its business 
activity. In principle, the intent of this Law is indisputable, its enforcement however is 
evidently restricted by the lack of guideline/criteria for determining how the regulations are 
"seriously violated", or how the "technical qualifications" of a business entity are defined. 
Besides, as traditional junket operators could be qualified as 
credit grantors by this Law, detailed revision and completion of 
this Law may be required before their business activities could be 
effectively monitored. 
According to the evidence as revealed in this study, it is 
clear that the introduction of the Junket Operator Regulation 
marks the outset of a form of progressive institutional change 
The introduction of the Junket 
Operator Regulation marks the 
outset of a form of progressive 
institutional change. 
(Bush 1987. 1101-1107) which reinstates the instrumental efficiency (i.e., the problem-
solving capacity) to Macao's casino industry. Nevertheless, this transition process is far 
from completion. Diffusion of the new instrumental values throughout Macao's junket 
operation still requires a real modification of the "habitual patterns of thought and 
behavior" so that "a higher level of instrumental efficiency" could ultimately be achieved. 
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Concluding remarks 
The promulgation of the Junket Operator Regulation is a necessary measure to 
furnish the opening of Macao's casino industry. Nevertheless, as new participants were 
admitted to the market immediately after the changes of the public policies, the existing 
participants could hardly change their customary ways of running business within a 
short period of time. For example, the existing structure of the junket operation had been 
practicing in a lawless area in the "old Macao" for almost two decades. The custom of 
this business, especially the long-established interrelationship between a casino operator 
and its private-YIP-room contractors, and between the private-YIP-room contractors and 
their associated junket operators, could impossibly be changed all at one time. 
To accommodate with the formal requirements as introduced by the Junket Operator 
Regulation, the existing participants in the traditional sector need to modify the structure 
and the ways of their business even though the process may take time. In view of the 
synergies carried with the American operators who conduct their YIP-play and mass-
market business under a set of much stricter US rules. it is foreseeable that the market 
would urge for modification to the custom of the existing gambling rooms of the local 
operator, which in turn, will call for revisions of the Junket Operation Regulation, as well 
as the way it is enforced in the coming decade. Consequently, interaction between the 
evolving informal constraints and the changing formal rules associated with the practice 
of the junket operators' business in Macao will lead to continuous modification to the 
structure. hence atiecting performance of the industry. 
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